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Abstract 
We analyze the Mexican Treasury securities primary auctions applying the structural 
econometric model proposed by Février, Préget, and Visser (2002).  The model is based on 
the share auction proposed by Wilson (1979) and estimates the parameters that characterize 
the distribution function of the securities’ marginal value and the conditional distribution of 
the signals given the securities’ value, respectively.  These estimated parameters are used to 
derive optimal bids and equilibrium prices of alternative auction mechanisms and compare 
revenues yielded through each one.  Our analysis of the primary auctions of the 
Certificados de la Tesorería de la Federación (CETES) carried out during the period 
between January 2001 and April 2002 shows the revenue superiority of the uniform format.  
Comparisons with previous reduced form analysis about the CETES and the French 
treasury securities, as well as simulation exercises with noisier value signals suggest that 
this result can be explained by the winner’s curse usually associated with market 
uncertainty. 
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Optimal Bidding in the Mexican Treasury Securities Primary Auctions:  
Results from a Structural Econometrics Approach 
1.  Introduction 
In this paper we apply the structural econometrics model of the share auction proposed by 
Février, Préget, and Visser (2002) (FPV) to analyze the distribution of the valuation for 
Mexican Treasury securities among the bidders participating in the primary auction and the 
sales revenues.  Our motivation for applying a structural analysis framework is twofold.  
On one hand, the objective of maximizing the treasury’s revenue from selling securities is 
important and the reason why auctions have become a predominant sales method –despite 
the ongoing debate among theorists and policymakers about which format produces higher 
revenues-.  However, because of the huge sums of money involved, in pursuing the goal of 
revenue maximization the sales agencies are very sensitive to the need to avoid unnecessary 
responses that could drive investors out of the markets.
1  In these regards, a well known 
survey about treasury securities markets in 1994 (Bartolini and Cottarelli, 1994) reported 
that within a sample of 77 countries, 42 of them employed an auction sales technique.  
Furthermore, among this group, 40 countries employed the discriminatory price format, 2 
countries employed the uniform price format and the remaining country a hybrid method.  
Only 7 of the auctioneering countries had switched from one format to another one, namely 
from the uniform to the discriminatory format –Belgium, Tanzania, France, Gambia, Italy, 
Mexico and the United States-, constituting the only “natural experiments” that were 
available for analysis purposes at that time.  There have not been many other switches 
between the discriminatory and uniform formats since then.
2  Perhaps the best known one 
                                                 
1  For instance, in September 1991, in the wake of Solomon Brothers’  admissions of deliberate and repeated 
violations of Treasury auction rules beginning in 1990, the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve and the 
Securities Exchange Commission undertook a joint review of the government securities market.  The report 
addressed a broad range of government securities market issues including the need to strengthen enforcement 
of Treasury’s auction rules; the need to automate the auctions; potential changes in Treasury’s auction 
technique and debt management policies; and the role of the primary dealers.  According to the Joint Report, 
the three agencies considered that any degradation in the smooth functioning of the government securities 
market would result in higher costs to the taxpayer; at that time, an increase in financing costs of only one 
basis point –one hundredth of one percentage point – would cost taxpayers over $300 million each year. 
2  However, this does not imply that there have not been other modifications on these markets.  For example, 
one modification that has been adopted in several countries is the practice of reopening securities’ issues 
regularly in order to improve information aggregation and increase the availability of each security.  Breedon 
and  Ganley (1996) analyzes this innovation in the treasury securities markets of the United Kingdom and 
Scalia (1998) in those of Italy.   3
occurred again in the United States, where the discriminatory format was substituted with 
the uniform format in 1999.  This, after carrying out one of the only explicit series of 
experiments on treasury securities auction formats.
3  Therefore, we think that this 
consideration favors the use of structural econometric models for this type of comparisons: 
they do not require observing the results obtained with different auction technique to assess 
their respective revenue generating properties. 
Our other motivation is that we think that, precisely because it is one of the few countries 
where different auction mechanisms have been employed to sell the securities at different 
times, the study of the Mexican Treasury securities is interesting from a solely analytical 
perspective.  Previous empirical studies that have exploited the “natural experiments” to 
analyze auctions’ revenue generating properties, using reduced form econometric 
equations.
4  In particular, Umlauf (1993) –perhaps one of the best known of these auction 
studies - analyzes the auctions of Certificados de la Tesorería de la Federación (CETES) 
carried out during the period 1986-1991.  The study’s best known conclusion is that auction 
participants accounted for the winner’s curse and consequently bid more cautiously in 
discriminatory auction when market uncertainty is high.  As a result, when Mexico 
substituted discriminatory for uniform pricing auctions in 1989 bidders’ profits were 
reduced, and seller’s revenue increased accordingly.  Laviada et al (1997) reached the same 
conclusion in their analysis of the CETES auctions carried in during the period 1995-1997, 
which covers another episode in which the Mexican Treasury switched format -this time 
from the uniform to the discriminatory one in November of 1995-.
5  Despite this evidence, 
the discriminatory auction format has been used to sell the CETES since that date (of 
course that the problems on interpreting parameters obtained from reduced form equations, 
best summarized as the Lucas critique, waive a yellow flag on drawing conclusions on what 
policymakers should have done in the light of these results).
6 
                                                 
3  For details about these experiments, see Uniform Price Auctions:  Update of the Treasury Experience(1995) 
and Uniform Price Auctions:  Update of the Treasury Experience (1998). 
4 Umlauf (1993), perhaps the best known among these kind of studies, analyzes through reduced form 
equations the CETES auctions carried out during the period 1986-1991. 
5  See appendix for more details about CETES sales techniques. 
6  Nonetheless, the Mexican Treasury has been using the uniform format to issue securities with maturity 
longer than a year and fixed rate at least since 2001.   4
This allows us to compare the predictions of a more rigorous structural econometric model 
with those coming from such reduced form equation models.  Assessing consistency 
between the two methods is valuable because neither constructing structural theoretical 
models nor estimating their empirical counterpart are easy tasks.  In the case of treasury 
securities auctions, this is well exemplified by the time lag that exists between the share 
auction model proposed by Robert Wilson in 1979 and any work that proposes an empirical 
counterpart to it that can be estimated.  So, reduced forms will continue to be a good 
approximation to understand complex economic settings and integrate theory and 
econometrics in future structural models. 
The structural econometric model of FPV is based on Wilson’s share auction model, which 
is regarded as the best theoretic approximation of the treasury securities auction’s context.
7  
The distribution function of the good’s value and the conditional distribution function of 
the signals given the good’s value are the key structural elements of interest in this 
structural econometric model.  These two functions are specified parametrically in order to 
estimate the parameter vector of interest.  Estimation is carried out in two stages.  In the 
first stage, the inverse demand function for the good is estimated through a kernel 
estimation method.  In the second stage, the estimated inverse demand function is inserted 
into the Euler equation that results from the optimization problem that the bidder of 
Wilson’s model solves.  This Euler equation can be interpreted as a set of moment 
restrictions that depend on the interest parameters.  Therefore, estimators belonging to the 
class of two stage semi parametric estimators studied by Newey and McFadden (1994) can 
be obtained minimizing an empirical counterpart derived from these restrictions through the 
generalized method of moments. 
                                                 
7 The key characteristics of the share auction model are the following.  It is a common valuation or value 
model in which a single perfect divisible good is sold to a set of symmetric and risk neutral bidders.  It 
assumes that the good’s value is unknown at the time of submitting bids and that, before the auction, bidders 
receive independent signals informative about the good’s value.  Each potential bidder’s bid consists of a 
price and a share of the good that the bidder is willing to buy at such price.  Each bidder can present as many 
bids as she desires, formulating in this way her individual demand curve for the good.  Adding up all bidders’ 
individual demand curves, the seller can then determine the market’s equilibrium price.  Given the allocation 
and payment mechanisms announced before the auction, winning bidders are allocated with fractions of the 
good for which they pay back to the seller.  In the uniform price auction format each bidder is allocated the 
fraction of the good that she demanded at the equilibrium price and she pays the equilibrium price.  In the 
discriminatory price auction format each bidder is allocated the fraction of the good that she demanded at the 
equilibrium price but pays the price bid corresponding to each marginal fraction that she receives.   5
The fact that this statistical inference method is only based on the Euler condition derived 
from the optimization problem of the bidder in a discriminatory price auction implies a very 
attractive advantage of this method:  although it must be assumed that an equilibrium 
strategy exists and that all bidders behave according to it, it is not necessary to know the 
equilibrium’s explicit form.  The method’s main disadvantage is its requiring a parametric 
framework to evaluate and compare auctions’ performance, although this characterization 
always makes possible to rank auctions in terms of the revenue produced. 
We use data from the primary auctions of Certificados de la Tesorería de la Federación 
(CETES) to estimate this structural econometric model.  The data set is built from the 
general results of the primary auctions that Banco de México publishes weekly at its 
website.  It includes 180 CETES auctions that were carried out between January 2001 and 
April 2002.  These data include the securities’ characteristics, the auction’s summary 
statistics and the anonymous distribution of prices and quantities, of both asked and 
allocated bids.  The characteristics of the CETES’ selling mechanism and the availability of 
all the variables suggested in the structural econometric model make our results comparable 
to those available for both the French and the Mexican Treasury securities markets.  In fact, 
several other central banks face similar conditions for revealing data about the auctions that 
they carry out.  So both that this estimation method does not rely on bidder specific data 
and that the data required to perform it can usually be obtained from public sources are 
advantages of this approach that deserve emphasis.  Structural models that are distribution 
free usually require bidder-specific data (Armantier and Sahib, 2003 or Hortacsu, 2002 and 
2002a), which in turn is more difficult to obtain.
8 
We model the CETES’ selling mechanism as a two stage game that suggests a breaking 
point for which the Euler equation of Wilson’s model is valid and permits the application of 
FPV’s structural econometric model.  The reason is that since October 2000, the Mexican 
Government put in place a market makers mechanism to improve treasury securities’ 
liquidity in the secondary market and promote investment in those securities.  So previous 
to the estimations we analyze how this mechanism may affect the behavior of bidders in the 
                                                 
8  For instance, in countries where the law protects information of financial market operations this only 
happens after a waiting period that may last several years. This is the case in Mexico since the Law of 
Transparency and Information Acquisition passed in 2002.   6
primary auction.  With this two stage framework and with additional information about the 
buy option for market makers, that is also published weekly by the Mexican central bank, 
we are able to identify the group of auctions that resemble the most closely the assumptions 
of the share auction model and draw comparisons with the other ones. 
Our results suggest that in Mexico the uniform price auction produces more revenues than 
the discriminatory price auction.  Revenues from the CETES discriminatory auctions 
carried out during the period from January 2001 to April 2002 totaled 79,767.05 billions of 
pesos.  In contrast, revenues from the corresponding hypothetical uniform auctions are 
80,918.47 billions of pesos; that is 1.44 percent more.  This result is stronger in the sample 
of auctions where there is no market maker activity in the buy option after the primary sale.  
For this sample the revenue of the uniform price mechanism is 31,294.72 billions of pesos, 
which exceeds that one from the discriminatory price mechanism by 731.69 billions of 
pesos, a difference of 2.09 percent.  These revenue differences are statistically significant in 
both cases. 
We also find that while for the short term 28 days CETES the discriminatory price auction 
produces higher revenues than the uniform price auction, for the longer term 91, 182 and 
364 days CETES it is the uniform price format that produces the highest revenue of both.  
However, we also observe a noticeable reduction in the revenue differential among both 
auction formats after May 2001, across all CETES maturities.  This date coincides with the 
adoption of modifications to the market maker mechanism intended to strengthen 
competition among them and, in turn, is suggestive of this mechanism becoming more 
effective in diffusing information in the securities’ secondary market.  Information 
diffusion, in turn,  has been identified as a factor that reduces the information problems that 
provoke the winner’s curse. 
This revenue ranking is opposite to what FPV find for the French Treasury securities 
auctions.  But it is the same result that has been obtained for the Mexican Treasury 
securities auctions through the reduced equation technique.  The present findings suggest in 
four different ways that the reason behind this superiority of revenues derived from the 
uniform price auction is associated to the winner’s curse.  First, the comparison with FPV’s 
parameters for the French Treasury securities shows that the conditional variance of the   7
value obtained in our exercise is considerably higher than the one they get.  This can be 
interpreted as a higher degree of uncertainty in the good’s value.  Second, besides the same 
revenue ranking, the comparison with the previous results of Umlauf (1993) and Laviada et 
al (1997) about the auctions of CETES with 28 days maturity show a positive relationship 
between the gains of employing the uniform format and the volatility of the securities resale 
price, which is another common measure of market uncertainty.  Third, the cross maturity 
comparison of our estimations also shows this pattern between gains from using the 
uniform format and volatility of the resale price.  Fourth, a simulation exercise in which we 
restimate the FPV’s model using a value signal constructed to have a higher variance (in 
effect, be noisier) than in the original data, shows that: 1) parameters obtained are 
consistent with the signals being less informative; and 2) revenues obtained from the 
hypothetical uniform auctions exceed those from the observed discriminatory auctions by 
an even larger proportion than before.  Therefore, the connection between market 
uncertainty and the winner’s curse appears in this study about the Mexican treasury 
securities to confirm the basic insights of reduced form approach, as well as to provide a 
check up of the structural approach. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the institutional 
framework of the CETES auctions.  Section 3 proposes the formal optimization problem of 
a bidder that participates in the CETES auctions.  Section 4 shows the data.  For the sake of 
this paper’s completeness, in section 5 we briefly present the estimation method proposed 
in FPV.  Section 6 presents the estimation results and the auction revenue comparison.  
Section 7 discusses the implications of our work regarding the winner curse.  Lastly, 
section 8 summarizes some conclusions and possible extensions. 
2.  Institutional framework of the Mexican Treasury securities primary auctions 
2.1  The Mexican Treasury securities 
The Mexican public debt market as is known today dates from the first emission of CETES 
in 1978.  CETES are credit titles issued and liquidated by the Federal Government at the 
maturity date.  The most common maturity dates have been 28, 91, 182 and 364 days.    8





12 is more recent.  In general, issuing of longer term securities largely 
obeys to the improvement on the country’s main macroeconomic variables affecting those 
financial instruments’ value.  As a matter of fact, only the CETES with maturity of 28 and 
91 days have been issued without major interruptions since 1978. 
CETES remain among the most important public debt instruments of the Federal 
Government, as the growth of their proportion of total public debt issued in the past years 
shows (Table 1).  Besides, short term interest rates used to value other debt instruments, 
whether of the treasury or private, are determined from the CETES’ rate; probably as a 
result of treasury securities’ preponderance in the money market instruments and, in turn, 
of money market’s preponderance in the stock market as a whole (Table 2).  All these 
characteristics of the CETES make them a good starting point for any analysis of the 
Mexican Treasury securities’ markets. 
INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE 
2.2  The CETES’ primary auction rules 
The sales mechanism of the Mexican Treasury securities has undergone several 
modifications since the first CETES were issued.
13  But for our analysis purpose, it is more 
useful to describe here in detail the institutional framework of the CETES primary auctions 
of the period between January 2001 and April 2002: 
•  Only brokerage houses, banks and investment funds based in Mexico can bid and 
get treasury securities.
14 
•  The announcement of the primary auction is published after the 12:00 hours of the 
last market day of the week immediately before the auction takes place on Banco de 
                                                 
9  BONDES are debt titles issued by the Federal Government to finance long term projects denominated in 
pesos.  BONDES  stands for Bonos de Desarrollo del Gobierno Federal, in Spanish. 
10  UDIBONOS are debt titles issued by the Federal Government to finance long term projects denominated in 
inflation adjusted monetary units. 
11  TESOBONOS stands for Bonos de la Tesorería de la Federación, in Spanish. 
12  AJUSTABONOS are long term debt instruments with a periodical adjustment according to variations of 
the Indice Nacional de Precios al Consumidor (national consumer price index) and liquidated at maturity. 
13  For more details, see Table A.1 of the appendix. 
14 Agents specifically authorized by Banco de México, the central bank, can also bid and buy treasury 
securities.   9
México’s website.
15, 16  This announcement provides both the auction and the 
securities characteristics.  Regarding the securities, it shows the date of issue, the 
announcement number, the issue’s identification number, the auction format, and 
the maximum amount tendered. 
•  Primary auctions can be of either the uniform price (or rate) or the discriminatory 
price (or rate) format. 
•  Bidding for CETES is only through competitive bids.  Each bidder must indicate the 
amount and discount rate at which she is willing to get the auction securities.
17  
Each bidder may submit one or more bids in the same auction.  Bids must be 
presented the second market day immediately before the securities’ issue date, no 
later than the 13:30 hrs. 
•  The sum of any bidder’s quantity bids for any auction must not exceed 60 percent of 
the maximum amount tendered. 
•  All bids are obligatory and irreversible for the bidder.  If a bidder does not pay for 
the securities she has been allocated in full, the Banco de México can cancel the sale 
for the unpaid securities amount.  In addition, it can ban the bidder to participate in 
subsequent securities’ primary auctions. 
•  The weighted allocation rate is determined based on the allocated bids. 
•  At any auction, the Treasury can determine the maximum discount rate at which it 
is willing to place the auction securities.  Higher discount rates are not served in 
those cases.
18 
•  Banco de México announces to each bidder the auctions’ results no later than the 
10:30 hrs of the market day immediately after the auctions take place through the 
bank’s attention system for account holders.
19  In addition, it announces the 
                                                 
15  Mexico’s central bank website address is http://www.banxico.org.mx. 
16  These announcements, in turn, follow the quarterly issuance calendar of the Ministry of Finance. 
17  Discount rates must be expressed in percentage points, up to two decimal points, in yearly terms and based 
on years of 360 days. 
18  However, since September 2002 the rule is that the Treasury only can declare the whole auction deserted if 
discount rates are too high. 
19 Sistema de Atención a Cuentahabientes del Banco de México (SIAC-Banxico), in Spanish.   10
auctions’ general results no later than the 18:30 hrs of the day of the auction through 
its website. 
•  Allocated securities are delivered through the securities’ custody institute on the 
issue date, on each bidder’s account.
20  Brokerage houses and banks must pay for 
the securities through the institute’s system.  Other institutions must pay for the 
securities through a brokerage house or a bank. 
Both the share auction of Wilson (1979) and the statistical inference method of FPV seem 
an adequate characterization of CETES auctions.  In fact, two characteristics of the CETES 
auctions make them even more similar to Wilson’s model than the French Treasury 
auctions are.  They both relate with the scope for submitting non competitive bids (a non 
competitive bid consists of an amount of securities’ that the bidder is willing buy at the 
auction’s weighted allocation rate).  The first one is that  the CETES primary auctions rules 
permit bidders to submit only competitive bids.  The second one is that securities allocated 
to market makers’ non competitive bids placed through the buy option, available after the 
primary auction, represent a smaller proportion of the total quantity of securities’ placed by 
the Mexican Treasury than by the French Treasury.
21 
A market makers mechanism has been in place in the Mexican Treasury securities market 
since October 2000.  In the next section we present an overview of this mechanism’s basic 
rules and suggest how the rules to allocate the buy option’s non competitive bids, in 
particular, make the problem of a bidder in the CETES auctions different of the problem of 
a bidder in the share auction model. 
2.3  The government securities’ market makers mechanism 
The market makers mechanism is only one of several measures adopted by the Mexican 
Government to improve treasury securities’ liquidity in the secondary market and promote 
                                                 
20 Instituto para el Depósito de Valores (S. D. INDEVAL).  INDEVAL is the only firm in México authorized 
to operate as a depository of securities.  Services it must provide include custody, administration and transfer 
of securities, as well as operation compensation and liquidation. 
21  Both institutional frameworks would be more similar to Wilson (1979) if an interior solution optimization 
problem constrained by the maximum bidding limit is assumed and if competitive bids can take any real 
positive value or zero.   11
investment in those securities.  It started to operate on October 2000.  Brokerage houses 
and banks willing to become market makers must fulfill the following obligations: 
1.  Place (competitive) bids in the treasury securities primary auctions for an amount 
greater than 20 percent of the maximum amount tendered. 
2.  Quote bid and ask prices for treasury securities continuously through trading houses 
during all market days.  These quotes must be within a specified maximum bid ask 
spread and for a minimum of 20 million pesos of the securities’ nominal value, for 
all securities and maturities determined by Banco de México. 
3.  Behave according to the best practices of the market and provide to the financial 
authorities all the information requested to quantify their market activity.  The index 
of market making activity weights the volume of operations in the primary and in 
the secondary market, with both clients and with financial intermediaries. 
4.  Set all necessary operation mechanisms. 
Fulfilling these obligations carry on certain operation risks for market makers.
22  Thus, in 
order to compensate this type of risks, market makers are granted the following rights: 
1.  Buy on their own account treasury securities at the weighted allocation rate 
resulting from the primary auction after it takes place. 
2.  Borrow treasury securities from Banco de México for short sales. 
3.  Attend to periodical meetings with the financial authorities. 
Some specific aspects of these general rules have been modified several times since the first 
version of them was announced.  For instance, the dates set to receive and evaluate the 
applications to become market makers, the weights given to each activity composing the 
market makers’ activity index, the maximum amount of treasury securities that can be 
awarded to market makers through non competitive bids in the buy option, etc.
23  However, 
changes of the rules to determine the maximum quantities awarded through this buy option 
                                                 
22 For instance, the inventory cost of holding a security is quite different when the next transaction is expected 
within the next hour than when it is expected until the next week or month.  Besides, if a market maker 
promises to deliver a certain security amount and this amount is not allocated to her in the primary auction, to 
comply to her promise she would have to buy it from other financial intermediaries in the market, probably at 
a higher price. 
23 See appendix.   12
are particularly relevant for our analysis.  This possibility of submitting non competitive 
bids after the primary auction may affect the competitive bidding that takes place in this 
contest.  The reason is that it allows bidders to divide their optimal demand among two 
sources.  In the first source, the primary auction, bidders face the conditions of the share 
auction described by Wilson (1979) in determining their respective optimal strategy.  In the 
second source, the buy option, there is an important difference in regards to the conditions 
that bidders face in determining their optimal strategy, with respect to the former source 
auction’s: knowing the weighted allocation rate of the primary auction implies that there is 
no price uncertainty in determining the optimal strategy of the buy option. 
Notice that there is an incentive to bid a larger proportion of the optimal individual demand 
through the buy option than through the primary auction that depends on the signal of the 
good’s value that a bidder receives:  if the signal flags a very low or uncertain value, 
optimal demand is lower and, as a consequence, it may be optimal to only place a non-
competitive bid through the buy option.  Therefore, a reason for linking the maximum 
quantities awarded through the buy option to allocations or bids of the primary auction, as 
occurs since January 2001, is reducing this incentive that may weaken primary auction 
competition and lower revenues.  However, this incentive is limited by the risk of not 
receiving a securities’ allocation through the buy option, given that other bidders may also 
exercise their buy option and that the supply is lower than in the primary auction.  So, in 
the next section we present a formal optimization problem in line with this institutional 
framework. 
3.  The  optimization problem of a bidder in the CETES auction. 
Last section’s description suggest a game of incomplete information with two stages.  In 
the first stage, bidders decide their optimal competitive bid following the set up of Wilson 
(1979), but subject to the constraint that the awarded quantity is less than or equal to their 
optimal demand.  If the quantity obtained in the primary auction indeed is lower than the 
bidder’s optimal demand, she can submit a non competitive bid in the buy option to obtain 
her optimal demand’s residual.  Since symmetry among bidders is required to obtain the   13
empirical equations derived by FPV, we assume that all bidders may participate in the two 
stages of the game.
24 
3.1  Stage 1 
As stated before, in this stage we want to keep the assumptions of Wilson’s share model as 
they are presented in FPV.  But in order to introduce the buy option in its aftermath, we 
slightly modify the notation.  Let us consider the auction of a perfectly divisible good 
among  2 ≥ n  risk neutral bidders.  The good’s value is the same for all bidders but 
unknown at the beginning of the auction.
25  It is assumed that the good’s value follows a 
distribution function  () ( ) v V v FV < = Pr .  Before the auction, each bidder  n i ,..., 1 =  receives 
a private signal about the good’s value.  This signal is a realization of the random variable 
Si.  Signals  n S S ,..., 1  are assumed to be independently and identically distributed given V. 
The distribution of Si given V is the same for all bidders and denoted as 
() ( ) v V s S v s F i V S = ≤ = | Pr | | .  The signal received by each bidder only is observed by her 
and not by either the seller or the rest of the bidders.  The number of bidders, n, and the 
distributions  () . V F  and  () . |V S F  are common knowledge.
26 
Each bidder must submit her bid, consisting of the fraction of the good that she requests at 
each price, to the seller.  The price and share combinations constitute her individual 
demand.  Adding up the individual demands, the seller can determine the market 
equilibrium price; that is, the price at which aggregate demand adds up to 1. 
Let us define as (.,.) 1i x  bidder i’s strategy in the primary auction.  This strategy is a 
function of the good’s price p and of the signal si, so that when bidder i gets the signal     
                                                 
24  The rules for market makers in place between October 2000 and January 2002 state that only five financial 
institutions operate as market makers.  This group could be modified partially or totally every six months 
based on the scores obtained in the market making activity index.  After February 2002, there is no maximum 
to the number of operating market makers and index punctuations are evaluated quarterly.  This flexibility to 
become or not a market maker is consistent with the assumption that all bidders are symmetric in both game 
stages. 
25  The standard assumption is that the securities’ value is given by their resale price at the secondary market.  
Notice that uniqueness of the resale price requires strong assumptions regarding securities’ markets 
completeness and absence of trade frictions.  The fact that in Mexico some financial intermediaries are 
constrained to invest on government securities suggests that this assumptions may not be totally adequate. 
26  Fudenberg and Tirole (1992).   14
Si= si, her bid specifies that she will demand a share  ) , ( 1 i i s p x .  In a symmetric optimal 
strategies equilibrium  ) , ( 1 i i s p x = ) (.,. 1 x  for all i. 
Along with this notation, the equation that defines the market equilibrium of the primary 
auction under the uniform price format as a function of the equilibrium price 
0 p  is written 
as: 








s p y s p x      (1), 
This equation depends on the bidder i’s signal and on the signals received by each one of 
the other bidders, which are unknown to bidder i.  As a result, also the equilibrium price 
0 p  
is unknown to bidder i.  But since bidder i knows the probability distribution function from 
which signals are extracted and the function  ) , ( 1 i i s p x , she can determine the conditional 
distribution of the random variable 
0 P : 
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If a uniform price auction format is employed, bidder i’s expected benefit when she 












1 1 | )) , ( , ; ( ) , ( ) ( i i i i s S s p y V p dH s p y p V E      (2) 
where the expected value is with respect to V given Si= si.  The strategy  () .,. 1 x  indeed is 
optimal if the maximum of equation (2) is attained at  ( ) ( ) .,. .,. 1 1 x y = .  Through calculus of 
variations, a solution to this optimization can be characterized.  The necessary condition for 
a maximum is that for all  [] ∞ ∈ , 0 p :   15
{} 0 | / ) , ; ( ) , ( / ) , ; ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 = = ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ − i i i s S y y V p H s p x p y V p H p V E      (3) 
where partial derivatives of H with respect to p and y1 are evaluated at  () i s p x y , 1 1 = .  On 



























i i s S s p y V p dH du s u y s p y p V E      (4) 
The Euler equation derived to maximize this expression is: 
{} 0 | ) , ; ( / ) , ; ( ) ( 1 1 = = − ∂ ∂ − i i s S y V p H p y V p H p V E      (5) 
and it has a corresponding empirical counterpart, as derived by FPV, written as: 
{ } { } { } { } 0 1 ) ( 1 ) ) ,..., | ( ( ) 1 (
0 0 0
1 1 = ≤ ⋅ − − ≤ ⋅ − = = ⋅ − p P P p E p P p s S s S V E n E n n      (6) 
where the first expected value is with respect to the signals  n S S ,..., 1  (the random variable 
0 P  only depends on these signals), the second one is with respect to V given  n S S ,..., 1 , the 
third one is with respect to 
0 P , and  { } 1  is the indicator function.  This condition is 
satisfied for all  [] ∞ ∈ , 0 p . 
However, our bidders maximize either equation (2) or (4), depending on the auction format, 
subject to the constraint that for all i: 
) , ( ) , ( ) , ( 2 1 i i i i i i s p y s p y s p y = +      (7) 
where ) , ( 2 i i s p y  is bidder i’s non competitive bid at the buy option and  ) , ( i i s p y  her 
optimal demand.
27 
3.2 Stage 2 
Once that stage 1’s primary auction is finished, the auction’s weighted allocation price  p  is 
computed as: 
                                                 
27  For simplicity, we ignore all restriction to the maximum amount that bidders can ask for in the primary 














1      (8) 
When  p  is announced, if bidder i’s competitive bid was partially awarded or is lower than 
her optimal demand, she submits a non competitive bid  ) , ( 2 i i s p x  to exercise the buy 
option, which depends on  p  and on her signal si.  Let us emphasize that at this stage 
bidders still do not know the good’s value, which is revealed until the good is resold ad the 
secondary market, as is assumed for treasury securities models in a standard manner.   
Therefore, V still is a random variable on bidder i’s decision. 
Once that the seller receives all non competitive bids from the bidders, he determine each 
bidder’s allocation and they make the corresponding payments.  The equation that defines 
stage 2’s market equilibrium is: 
5
1




s p y s p x     (9) 
when the seller commits to offer at most 20 percent of the maximum amount tendered in 
the primary auction and it is possible that supply exceeds aggregate demand.  Two states of 
nature can be deduced from the buy option rules, according to whether the sum of 
submitted bids exceeds or not the available supply.  In the first state, the sum of submitted 
bids is less than or equal to supply and, consequently, each bidder gets her quantity bid and 
equation (9a) is satisfied.  In the second state, the sum of submitted bids is greater than 
supply, so each bidder gets an amount lower than or equal to her bid, according to the buy 
option allocation rules. 
The buy option allocation rules may stipulate that the amount awarded to each bidder 
depends only on the sum of submitted bids, as occurred in Mexico from October to 








i j i s p y s p x ) , ( ), , ( 2 2 λ .  But the rules may stipulate a much more complex allocation 
function that depends on the amount allocated to bidder i in the primary auction, on bidder 
i’s competitive bids or only on a fraction of these bids within an specified range close to  p , 
as occurs in Mexico after May 2001.  But, regardless that the amount awarded to each   17







i i j i s p y s p y s p x ) , ( ), , ( ), , ( 1 2 2 λ  where 
) , ( 1 i s p y corresponds to her competitive bids within an interval around  p , the sum of 





i λ .     (10) 
At this game stage bidder i still does not know the signals that the rest of the bidders 
received.  Hence, the final state of the game is unknown when she must make her decision, 
bringing an element of quantity uncertainty into it.  But since she knows the function 
(.,.) 2 x  and the distribution function from which the signals Sj,  i j ≠ , are extracted, she can 
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Then, bidder i’s expected benefit when she employs strategy  ) , ( 2 i i s p y , the weighted 


























where, again, the expected value is with respect to V given  i i s S = .  From the bidders’ point 
of view, optimization of equation (11a) with respect to  ( ) i s p y , 2  is not restricted. 
This problem set up provides two important insights for the model’s estimation.  First, 
within this framework it seems that the effect in the estimation method of ignoring the non 
competitive bidding of the buy option may not be negligible.  Therefore, it is important to 
break the estimation problem down into smaller parts in which the dynamic first order   18
condition of Wilson’s model is valid.  In this two stage model of the CETES auction there 
is an obvious breaking point.
28  Notice that if the optimum of bidder’s stage 2 problem is 
that  () 0 .,. 2 = x , then in her optimal choice of the stage 1 problem  ( )( ) .,. .,. 1 y y = ; in effect, 
her optimal competitive bid coincides with her individual demand.  Therefore, in this case 
the solution simplifies into the original share auction model.  The obvious immediate 
question is when does this solution occurs.  Let us suggest two conjectures.  The first and 
most natural one is when the bidders’ signals show that the good’s value is low, in 
particular if  V p > .  The second one is that bidders’ expected allocation of the primary 
auction is equal to their respective individual demand; that is, if bidders are confident on 
their value signal. 
The second insight regards the data requirements.  Estimation of an empirical counterpart 
of an interior solution to the second stage ( ( ) 0 .,. 2 > x ) requires data of all the bidders’ bids 
in the primary auction and in the buy option. 
4.  Data 
The data base for our analysis is built from the general results of the primary auctions that 
Banco de México publishes weekly at its website.  It includes 180 CETES auctions that 
were carried out between January 2001 and April 2002.  These data include the securities’ 
characteristics, the auction’s summary statistics and the anonymous distribution of prices 
and quantities, of both asked and allocated bids.  In this period the 28 and 91 days CETES 
were auctioned weekly, the 182 days CETES every 2 weeks and the 364 days CETES every 
4 weeks.
29  On the other hand, the series of secondary market prices of the CETES comes 
from the price vector that Banco de México calculates and publishes on its website.
30 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
                                                 
28  See Pakes (1991) for further discussion on dynamic structural model estimation. 
29  In the sample there are CETES with maturity of 27, 90, 168, 182, 335 or 363 days.  These result from 
computing the securities’ maturity according to the number of market days and from the practice of 
“reopening” the 182 and 235 days CETES issues to improve their liquidity.  For presentation purposes, this 
issues are grouped based on their closeness to the 4 basic maturities. 
30    To perform this valuation at market prices, Banco de México obtains daily information by surveying the 
main trading houses that operate in the market, Enlaces Prebon, Eurobrokers, Remate Electrónico, and SIF-
Garban Intercapital, besides the information that INDEVAL also sends to the institute.  For more details, see 
Metodología para la Valuación de los Certificados de la Tesorería de la Federación, Banco de México.   19
Table 3 shows the basic statistics of this dataset.  There were 3,581 “different” auction 
bidders which presented 13,392 competitive bids that total approximately 2,675,255 
millions of pesos.  Of these bids, 33.64 percent were allocated totally or partially, while 
66.36 percent were rejected.  The total amount of CETES issued by the Treasury is 
approximately 879,249 millions of pesos.  Therefore, 93.65 percent of this quantity was 
placed through competitive bids the primary auction and only  6.35 percent was placed 
through market makers’ non competitive bids in the buy option.  FPV report for the French 
Treasury securities these last two figures are 91 and 8 percent, respectively (with the 1 
percent residual placed through non competitive bids received in the primary auctions).  
Hence, their argument that this amount of non competitive bidding is too small to have an 
effect on the assumptions that support their estimation method could be invoked in the 
CETES auctions also.  But data availability will allow us to pursue this point a little bit 
further. 
Table 4 shows summary statistics per auction of the variables suggested by FPV for the 
empirical estimation.  Statistics calculated for the whole CETES sample are comparable to 
the French securities auction data that those authors report.  The most obvious difference 
among the two samples regards the securities’ average maturity, which in Mexico is shorter 
than 1 year and in France is longer than 10 years. In general, the longer that the securities’ 
maturity date is, the higher is the nominal yield and the lower is the secondary market price.  
So, for similar maturity dates, securities’ secondary market prices seem to be higher in 
Mexico than in France.  In turn, the variance of the maturity dates, nominal yields and 
secondary market prices suggest less heterogeneity in our sample than the French securities 
sample.  Notice that the variables of number of bidders, number of bids and cover (defined 
as the ratio of total amount of quantity bids to total amount issued by the Treasury), which 
measure the degree of auction competition, do not vary much across CETES with different 
maturity.  Regarding average amount issued by the Treasury per auction, it should be kept 
in mind that short term CETES are issued more frequently than long term CETES. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
Summary statistics per bidder and per bid of the CETES auctions are shown in Table 5.  In 
each auction each bidder submitted 4 bids on average.  The number of winning bids per 
winning bidder is 3 on average.  According to FPV in France and in Portugal bidders   20
present 3 bids on average, while in Turkey they present 7 bids on average.  If a bidder 
distributes her individual demand into a larger number of bids as an optimal strategy to 
lessen the winner’s curse, these numbers suggest that the bidders that participate in the 
Mexican auctions perceive a more uncertain environment than those participating in the 
French or Portuguese auctions, but less uncertain than those participating in the Turkish 
auctions.  Moreover, the CETES’ price bid is 96.68 on average, while the difference 
between the highest and the lowest price bids is 0.38 on average. Thus, the comparison to 
the French data -98.54, 7.93, 0.7, and 0.7, respectively- also supports this assertion. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
On the other hand, average quantity bids per bidder is 770.63 millions of pesos, and 
average winning quantity bids per winning bidder is 576.62.  This would suggest that each 
winning bidder receives on average 74.82 percent of her quantity bid.  However, this 
expectation that every bidder gets 75 percent of the securities she requested is not supported 
by the rest of the data.  The mean and standard deviation of the demanded quantity per bid 
are 204.29 and 61.09, respectively; while those of the allocated quantity per winning bid 
are 432.92 and 571.62, respectively.  Since the distributions of the two variables are 
truncated at zero, these statistics coincide more with a pattern of asymmetric information 
among the bidders.
31  In this pattern, bidders who present large bids have more information 
about the good’s value than bidders who present small bids and, as a consequence, large 
bids win more often than small bids.
32 
Now, let us present some data of the CETES buy option in order to get a better grasp of 
how it works and of its link with the primary auction.  The sample that we employ is built 
from the buy option results that Banco de México publishes on its website every week.  
There are 158 CETES buy options in the period within January 2001 and April 2002.  
Table 6 presents this sample’s summary statistics.  The supply tendered through the buy 
options represents 1/5 of the  total amount issued through the primary auctions, as the buy 
                                                 
31  Notice that asymmetry across bidders may also be the result of different costs of obtaining or placing 
customers offers. 
32  For the 28 days CETES auctions of the period 1986-1991, Umlauf (1993), whose data permits to 
distinguish bidders’ sizes, also finds evidence that suggest that there is asymmetric information between the 
large and the small bidders.  Since in Mexico banks and brokerage houses place bids on their own and on 
customers’ behalf, intermediaries with the highest market shares presumably collect more information than 
others and, as a result, place better bids.  Hence, there is congruence between both sets of results.    21
option rules stipulate and we assume in the previous section’s model.  In turn, both the total 
demand and amount issued to the market makers are less than the buy option supply, on 
average (in addition, these two variables’ mode is zero).  As a result, the proportion of total 
demand and amount issued in the buy options with respect to the total amount issued in the 
primary auctions is less than 10.5 percent for all CETES maturities.  Notice that the fact 
that these two proportions slightly decrease with maturity suggests that this mechanism 
works to obtain a quantity of securities above than the maximum limit of the primary 
auction.  If instead it worked to diversify a security’s value uncertainty (expected to be 
larger for longer term CETES), one would expect that the proportion of quantity demand to 
primary auction quantity issue increases with the term.  However, the maximum statistic 
does show that there are auctions where the quantity demanded exceeds supply. 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
We further distinguish three events in the buy option sample:  1) when market makers’ 
aggregate demand is zero, 2)  when market makers’ (positive) aggregate demand is less 
than or equal to the supply, and 3)  when market makers’ (positive) aggregate demand is 
larger than supply.   According to Table 7, these events’ frequencies are 44.94, 38.69, and 
16.45 percent, respectively; so event 1 is the most commonly observed one.  This agrees 
with the previous discussion:  not only buy options without any bidding are more frequent 
in the 182 and 364 days CETES than in the 28 and 91 days CETES; also, buy options 
where aggregate bidding exceeds supply are less frequent in the shorter than in the longer 
maturities. 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
When the buy options without any bidding are taken out of the sample, the amount 
allocated to market makers through this mechanism averages 17 percent of the primary 
auction issue size, with a maximum of 50 percent.  This suggests that the problem of a 
bidder who participates in the primary auction may be affected by the existence of the buy 
option.  Thus, we separate from our original CETES primary auctions sample, which we 
label “sample I” onwards, 71 of them after which no bids were presented in the buy option.  
Let us next describe the overall information, statistics per auction, and statistics per bidder 
and per bid of this second sample, which we label “sample II”.   22
According to the information presented in Tables 8, 9 and 10, sample II is more biased 
towards longer term CETES than sample I.  This produces that average maturity and 
secondary market price are higher and average nominal yield is lower in sample II than in 
sample I.  Also, in sample II the number of bidders has both lower mean and standard 
deviation than sample I.  In turn, cover has a higher mean in sample II than in sample I, 
despite that maturity does not seem to affect these statistics in sample I.  The maturity, 
secondary market price and nominal yield statistics suggest that this coincides with the 
securities’ value in sample II being lower than in sample I, as one of our conjectures in the 
previous section states.  On the other hand, statistics per bidder and per bid indicate that the 
number of bids and number of winning bids on average are very similar across the two 
samples.  However, quantity demand per bidder averages 722.79 millions of pesos, and 
allocated quantity per winning bidder averages 693.97 millions of pesos.  Hence, each 
winning bidder of the sample II auctions obtains on average 96.01 percent of her quantity 
bid, which is a higher percentage than in sample I.  This also coincides with one of our 
guesses for the lack of market makers participation in the buy options.  However, notice 
that since the mean of the quantity per bid is 197.31 and that of the allocated quantity per 
winning bid is 530.14, the possible information asymmetry among bidders also seems 
stronger in sample II than in sample I. 
INSERT TABLES 8, 9 AND 10 HERE 
In the next section we estimate the empirical model with the two samples.  This will permit 
us to verify whether the parameters we obtain for sample II suggest a lower securities’ 
value than those we obtain for sample I. 
5.  Estimation 
Let us briefly present the empirical methodology proposed by FPV for the sake of 
completeness.  The estimation method exploits the results of L auctions that exhibit 
observed heterogeneity among them.  Let l be the index to denominate the variables 
specific to the l-th auction.  It is to be expected that neither the good’s value nor the number 
of bidder is the same among them.  A vector of common variables, zl, is introduced to 
capture this observed heterogeneity that characterizes the good sold in the l-th auction, as 
well as the number of bidders, nl.   23
It is assumed that these random variables (Nl, Zl),  L l ,..., 1 = , are independently and 
identically distributed.  The good’s value in the l-th auction, Vl is assumed to be dependent 
of Zl and independent of Nl .  Similarly, the signal received by bidder i in the auction l, Sil, 
depends on Zl   and  Vl.  The value realizations of V1,...,VL, conditional on Zl, are 
independently and identically distributed.  Besides, S1l,...Snl are independent conditional on 
Zl and Vl and the signals Sil and Si´l´ are also independent conditional on Zl and Zl´ for all 
´ l l ≠ . 
To describe the distribution functions of these variables, a parametric framework is 
adopted.  The conditional distribution of Vl given Zl=z is denoted  ) ; | ( 1 | θ z F Z V ⋅ , where  1 θ is 
a parameter vector.  The conditional distribution function of the signals Sil given Vl=v and 
Zl =z is denoted  ) ; , | ( 2 , | θ z v F Z V S ⋅ , where  2 θ  is a parameter vector.  From these two 
distributions, the distribution function of Sil given Zl=z, ) ; | ( | θ z F Z S ⋅ , where  )' ' , ' ( 2 1 θ θ θ = , 
can be determined. 
The objective is to find an estimator of θ
0, the true value of θ .  Estimation is carried out in 
two stages.  Stage 1 consist on determining the distribution of optimal bids.  First, the 
optimal strategy as a function of the price, the signal, the number of bidders, the vector of 
auction characteristics, and the parameters,  ) ; , , , ( 0 θ z n s p x , is determined.  This strategy is 
bidder i’s optimal demand for the good at price p and with the signal si, when there are n 
auction bidders, the auction characteristic is z, and the parameter vector is θ
0.  For any 
[] ∞ ∈ , 0 p , let  ) ; , | ( p z n G ⋅  be the distribution function of  ) ; , , , ( 0 θ z n s p x  conditional on 
Vl=v and Nl =n.  Then: 
( ) z Z n N x Z N S p x p z n x G l l l l il = = ≤ = , | ) ; , , , ( Pr ) ; , | (
0 θ  
( ) z Z n N x z n S p x l l il = = ≤ = , | ) ; , , , ( Pr
0 θ  
( ) z Z n N z n S p x x S l l il il = = ≥ =
− , | ) ; , , , , ( Pr
0 1 θ  
( ) z Z z n S p x x S l il il = ≥ =
− | ) ; , , , , ( Pr
0 1 θ  
( )
0 0 1
| ; | ) ; , , , , ( 1 θ θ z z n S p x x S F il il Z S
− ≥ − = ,   24
where the fourth equality is derived from the assumption that Sil and Nl are conditionally 
independent and the third equality is satisfied whenever the optimal strategy is a decreasing 
function of the signal.  Therefore: 
( )
0 1 1 ; | ) ; , | ( 1 ) ; , , , , ( |
0 θ θ z p z n x G F z n S p x x Z S il − =
− −           (12) 
This inverse demand’s role in the estimation procedure is crucial.  For any  [] ∞ ∈ , 0 p  the 
distribution function  ) ; , | ( p G ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  can be estimated non parametrically from the observed bids 
) ; , , , (
0 θ l l il ilp z n s p x x = , i=1,...,nl , l=1,...,L, using kernel estimation methods.
33  A non 






















































) ; , | ( ˆ      (13) 
where ) , ( ⋅ ⋅ K  is a kernel and  N h  and hZ are the bandwidth parameters.  In this case, hZ is the 
vector of bandwidth parameters for each characteristic z. 
Once that this distribution function is obtained, the Euler equation is rewritten introducing 
the auction specific variables.  For auction l with characteristics zl and nl bidders, this 
condition becomes: 
{ } { }
{} {} 0 , | 1 ) (
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z Z n N p P P p E
z Z n N p P p s S s S V E n E
l l l l
l l l l nl nl l l l l
l
l      (14) 
where the random variable 
0
l P represents the equilibrium price at auction l and the first 
expected value is taken with respect to  l nl il S S , ,...,  given Nl=nl, and  Zl=zl.  This condition 
must hold for all  [] ∞ ∈ , 0 p  and all l=1,...,L. 
An empirical counterpart for equation (9) is required to carry out the estimation.  This is not 
trivial because the signals s1l,...,snl,l  are not observable.  It is known that 
                                                 
33 Pagan and Ullah (1999).   25
) ; , , , , (
0 1 θ z n S p x x s il il
− = , which is the inverse demand.  The inverse demand is unknown, 
but given relation (7), for any θ , it is natural to replace the inverse demand with: 
() θ θ ; | ) ; , | ( ˆ 1 ) ; , , , , ( ~ |
1 1 z p z n x G F z n S p x x Z S il − =
− −      (15) 
In turn, this suggest replacing the unobserved signals with  ) ; , , , , ( ˆ
1 θ z n S p x x il
− , for any θ , 
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Given that equation (14) is satisfied for an infinite number of prices, in effect,  [ ] ∞ ∈ , 0 p , 
there exists an infinite number of moments and, for each of these theoretical moments, 
there exists an empirical counterpart with the form (16).  As FPV (2002) do, we limit to the 
estimation of a fix number of moments (T).  This fix number is given by the number of 
auctions in the sample. 













2 ) ; , ,..., , ,..., , ,..., , ,..., ( min ˆ θ θ
θ      (17) 
6.  Results 
6.1  Parameters 
The set of variables that define the auctions’ observed heterogeneity are the secondary 
market price (in pesos), maturity (in days) and nominal yield (in percent) as shown in Table 
5; that is, the dimension of zl is equal to 3.
34  At the first estimation stage, the distribution 
function ) ; , | ( p z n x G  is estimated using the Epanechnikov  kernel.  In this kind of 
estimation, a vector of observations is required to evaluate the kernel for each of the 
                                                 
34 The nominal yield is the weighted average rate of allocation.   26
variables z.  This vector is denoted as  ) , , (







































































where  {} 1 | | 1 ) 1 ( 75 . 0 ) (
2 ≤ − = u u u K  and hN , h1Z , h2Z, and h3Z are bandwidth parameters.  To 







hi = , 
for  {} Z N i , = , where s is the standard deviation of variable i and L the number of 
observations.  According to  i h , bandwidth parameters differ across the variables if they 
show different variability in the data. 
The calculated values are hN= 20.6216, hz1=3.3344, hz2= 3.6252 y hz3= 99.8950 for sample 
I and hN=24.1532, hz1=4.2820, hz2=3.8100 and  hz3=117.5569 for sample II.  These values 
are consistent with what it is shown in tables 5 and 10, where it can be seen that the number 
of bidders and nominal exhibit a higher variance then the secondary market price and 
maturity. 
As it has been discussed before, it is necessary to choose parametric specifications for the 
signal and valuation distribution functions. The specifications selected in FPV have the 
property that closed form solutions can be obtained for optimal strategies and equilibrium 
prices in the uniform price auction.  With these, the hypothetical uniform auction revenues 
can be compared with actual discriminatory auction revenues. 
The distribution function of Vl given Zl = zl thaty they propose is: 





















1 |       (18) 
where  α α ⋅ = ) , 1 ( l l z  and  β β ⋅ = ) , 1 ( l l z .   ) (⋅ Γ is the gamma function, α  and β are 
parameter vectors of 4×1 dimension, and γ is a scalar.  If γ =1 the distribution described in   27
(18) is a gamma distribution with parameters  l α  y  l β . In this case, Vl follows a gamma 
distribution with conditional mean  l l β α  conditional variance of 
2
l l β α . On the other 
hand, if  1 ≠ γ  then 
γ
l V  follows a gamma distribution with parameters  l α  y  l β . Note also 
that  () γ β α θ , ' , ' 1 = . 
The specification that they choose for the probability distribution of Sil given Vl =v and Zl 
=z, is an exponential distribution: 
[ ]
γ θ l l l Z V S sv z v s F − − = exp 1 ) ; , | ( 2 , |      (19) 
where  γ is the same parameter that appears in the conditional distribution of Vl .  In this 
case, the conditional expected value and the conditional variance of Sil are independent of 
zl.  So the complete vector of parameters is:  ) , ' , ' ( γ β α θ = ; that is θ , which has 9×1 
dimension. 
On the second stage 
0 θ , the true value of θ , is estimated.  This parameter’s estimator is 
defined by equation (12), in which, given the specifications described in (13) and (14), the 












































= = = = =
∑ =
− −
p z n x G
n
n










Since only a finite number of moments are used in order to perform the estimation, 
although the Euler equation is satisfied for  [ ] ∞ ∈ , 0 p , the number of moments is chosen 
from the existing number of stop out prices in each sample.  Therefore, T=180 for sample I, 
and T=71, for sample II.  The corresponding standard errors are computed with the 
asymptotic variance-covariance matrix derived in FPV (2002), Appendix C. 
Second stage estimation results for samples I and II are shown in tables 12 and 13, 
respectively.  All parameters are significant and different from zero at 5 percent confidence 
level.   28
INSERT TABLES 11 AND 12 HERE  
Given the value of θ and using equation (13),  ) | ( l l l z Z V E =  can be computed. Once this 
value is obtained, derivatives of this expected value with respect to each of the variables z 
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l
l
l l l dv z v vf z Z V E    (21) 
The derivatives are evaluated at the sample mean of the characteristics.  For sample I, the 
derivatives of equation (21) with respect to secondary market price, nominal yield, and 
maturity are -0.0804, -0.1769, and -0.1265 respectively.
35  Although the first sign is not 
very intuitive, the latter two are because it is usually expected that the securities’ value 
grows as the secondary market price is larger and the nominal yield and maturity are lower. 
On the other hand, for sample II, the corresponding derivatives are 0.4048, -0.5876, and -
0.0641, respectively.  Besides the sign differences, notice the higher sensitivity with respect 
to the secondary market price and rate of return in absolute terms and the lower sensitivity 
with respect to maturity obtained in sample II, in comparison to sample I.  These 
differences across samples could be due to some sort of non-linearity argument, but also to 
a small sample bias or simple lack of robustness. 
6.2  Conditional mean and variance. 
For sample I, the average estimated expected value given the signals, 
) , ,..., | ( 1 l l nl nll il l l z Z s S s S V E = = = ,  is equal to 0.9910 and an average value, 
) | ( l l l z Z V E = ,  is equal to 1.0004.  On the other hand, for sample II, the average of 
) , ,..., | ( 1 l l nl l n il l l z Z s S s S V E l = = =  is equal to 0.9899 and the average of  ) | ( l l l z Z V E =  is 
equal to 0.9941.  These values are consistent with the conjecture we formulate in section 3; 
that is, the auctions in the sample where non competitive bids are not observed in the buy 
                                                 
35 These values are lower in magnitude than those that FPV calculate for the French securities auctions.  The 
difference in magnitude of these results seems to be related to the magnitude of gamma and of the constants.  
For instance, both of the two gammas calculated in this exercise are higher than the one estimated in FPV.   29
option are those in which bidders receive signals that indicate a lower expected value of the 
CETES, compared with the rest of the CETES auctions.
36 
For the values obtained in sample I, the average spread is 0.0237.  For sample II, this value 
is 0.0287.  On the other hand, the spread between  ) | ( l l l z Z V E =  and the stop out price is 
equal to 0.0332 and 0.0329, for samples I and II, respectively.  It seems more natural that 
the spread increases with the good’s value because, if the good is valuable competition 
should be stronger and the resulting stop-out price should be lower.  But the data indicate 
that this is the case only when we look at the average expected value. 
6.3  Revenue comparison 
As it has been said before, an important advantage of this structural model is that it permits 
to construct the optimal strategies and equilibrium prices that would arise in a uniform price 
auction.  The explicit expression of the optimal strategy that results from the environment 


















































θ      (22) 
Given the two sep estimator, 
0 θ , and equation (10), it is possible to define for each bidder i 
and auction l, the estimated signal   ) ˆ ; | ) ; , | ( 1 ( ˆ
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− .  The demand 
functions for each bidder are obtained by replacing sil by  il s ˆ  into the above expression.  
Once that the optimal strategy is estimated, the hypothetical revenue from the uniform price 
auction can be computed.  First, the equilibrium price at the l–th uniform price auction is 
calculated by making aggregate demand equal to supply.  The reduced expression of this 
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36 Estimations of  ) , ,..., | ( 1 l l nl nll il l l z Z s S s S V E = = = , the secondary market prices, the stop out prices, 
and  ) | ( l l l z Z V E =  for all auctions, computed from the estimators obtained for each sample, are omitted 
for the sake of briefness but are available from the authors upon petition.   30
Then the hypothetical revenue from uniform price auction l is computed as just the product 
of the equilibrium price times the amount of bonds auctioned.  The total hypothetical 
revenue obtained with this process is 80,918.48 billions of pesos, while the revenue 
observed in the discriminatory auction is 79,767.05 billions of pesos.  Hence, had the 
Federal Government used the uniform price mechanism to auction its securities instead of 
the discriminatory price mechanism, it would have raised 1,151.42 billions of pesos more; 
that is, 1.44 percent higher revenues.  This also seems to be the case when only the auctions 
of sample II are considered. In the sample II auctions the revenue of the uniform price 
mechanism is 31,294.72 billions of pesos, which exceeds that one from the discriminatory 
price mechanism by 731.69 billions of pesos, a difference of 2.09 percent. 
In order to test the significance of these estimates, we calculate the bootstrapped confidence 
intervals of the difference in revenue per auction. For the Sample I, we find a significant 
difference between the discriminatory and the uniform auction. The bootstrapped mean of 
the difference is approximately 6 millions of pesos, with an upper bound of 4.50 million 
and a lower bound of 4 million. This difference is higher in Sample II, where we calculate a 
bootstrapped mean of 9.61 millions of pesos.  This difference shows a confidence interval 
of 95% between 12.53 and 5.25 millions of pesos, per auction. 
INSERT TABLE 13 HERE 
We calculated the bootstrapped interval several times and found that their figures do not 
change across calculations.  The bootstrap methodology here was not applied through the 
whole estimation process since we also estimated the standard errors of the structural 
estimators and they are significant. The aggregated difference seems small, but it is 
considerably negative in each auction. The estimated density functions for the revenue 
difference are shown in Graphs 1 and 2. 
INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 HERE 
It is important to point out two other features of the results.  First, that this revenue 
superiority from the uniform scheme is reduced throughout the analysis period.  Second, 
that this revenue superiority is different across CETES with different maturity.  For the 28-
day CETES auction, the discriminatory scheme obtains higher revenues than the uniform 
one.  Benefits derived from the discriminatory auction increase through time, from 0.3   31
percent to 1.35 percent.  On the other hand, for the rest of the CETES, the uniform price 
auction is revenue superior.  But, this superiority decreases through time as well. For 
example, in the 91-days CETES auctions, the benefit of implement a uniform price auction 
goes from 2.66 percent  to a loss of 0.28 percent. In the 182-day CETES auctions, this 
benefit is reduced from 7 to 1.4 percent. Finally, revenue from selling the 364-days CETES, 
where benefits are the highest, these are reduced from 10 to 5 percent (Figure 3). 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
If only the auctions from sample II are considered, these two phenomena are more dramatic 
(Figures 4).  The benefit from selling 28-days CETES in a discriminatory scheme is 0.61 
percent, on average.  On the contrary, in the sales of 91, 182 and 364 days CETES, a 
uniform price auction gets revenues that exceed those of a discriminatory price auction by 
1.35, 4.55 and 11.81  percent respectively. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
It is important to notice that the date after which the revenues from discriminatory auctions 
start raising noticeably is May 2001.  This is a date when new rules for the non competitive 
bidding at the market makers’ buy option came into effect.  These rules make the maximum 
quantity allocation of securities a function of the market makers’ competitive bids 
submitted in the primary auction.  In this way, setting rules that promote competition 
among market makers may have contributed to more aggressive bidding in the 
discriminatory auction and, with this, the revenue differential may have been reduced.
37  
These trends may explain why, if a maturity cutoff has to be chosen below which the 
discriminatory format is to be used and above which the uniform format is to used, the 
Mexican authorities chose a 365 days cutoff. 
7.  Some implications regarding the winner’s curse 
7.1  A comparison with the previous results about CETES and French Treasury 
securities auctions 
According to the applied model, one possible reason why a uniform price auction seems to 
be more appropriate to sell the Mexican securities, in contrast with the findings of FPV for 
                                                 
37 See Table A.2 for more details.   32
French securities, is that the conditional variance of the value obtained in this exercise is 
considerably higher than the one they get.  This can be interpreted as a higher degree of 
uncertainty in the good’s value, which would be a reason for the winner’s curse being 
stronger in Mexico than in France.  In this sense, the values of  l α  and  l β  evaluated at the 
sample mean of  z can be seen in Table 14.  It is important to remember that in this case 
γ
l V  
follows a gamma distribution with parameters l α  and  l β . 
INSERT TABLE 14 HERE 
According to the Table’s 14 data, the distribution of 
γ
l V  in our two samples exhibit a 
higher variance than the one obtained in FPV. This higher dispersion can be appreciated 
better by looking at the coefficients of variation, which also are higher in the Mexican 
samples than in the French sample.  Therefore, it can be said that the Mexican market 
shows more value uncertainty than the French market. 
Let us now compare our findings with the previous ones for the CETES with 28 days 
maturity date.  We construct the variance of the daily funding rate with government 
securities over the five-day period leading to and including the day of auction execution -
that is, the variable used to proxy resale risk and information dispersion in the previous 
studies- for the periods examined by Umlauf (1993), Laviada et al (1997), as well as in the 
present study.  For the first two, we construct the revenue of the discriminatory format as 
the product of the amount issued times the average allocation price.  Similarly, we construct 
the revenue of the hypothetical uniform auction as the amount issued times the sum of the 
average allocation price plus the mark-up per bid in the uniform auction with respect to the 
discriminatory format reported by those authors (which in both cases is positive).  Then the 
gain of using the uniform format is calculated as the revenue difference between these two 
figures.  In Table 15.1 we can see that there is a positive relationship between the gains of 
using the uniform format instead of the discriminatory one and market uncertainty.  While 
this gain is positive in the auctions examined by Umlauf and Laviada et al, it is negative in 
those we examined.  In turn, this is connected with higher market volatility in those 
samples than in ours. 
INSERT TABLE 15.1 HERE   33
Next let us look for the pattern described above in our results for CETES with different 
maturity date.  For this exercise, we construct the variance of resale price with the data of 
the CETES secondary market price index published by Enlaces Prebon (IEP index), which 
is one of the interdealer brokerage firms operating in the Mexican Stock Market.
38  This 
substitution is necessary because for this exercise we need different resale price volatility 
across CETES maturities, which cannot generated from either the daily funding rate or the 
weekly price vector of Banco de México used before.
39 On the other hand, to consider 
comparable samples we only look at 17 auctions of each maturity date (recall that the 364 
days CETES are auction monthly, restricting the sample size for the other securities).  In 
Table 15.2 we can appreciate the same positive relationship between the gains of using the 
uniform auction format and market volatility in the CETES with maturity of 28 , 91 and 
182 days.  But it fails in the case of the 364 days CETES.  We think that this obeys to a 
problem with the IEP index, due to lower transaction volumes for longer maturities, rather 
than to this securities’ resale market being in fact less uncertain than those for the shorter 
term maturities. 
INSERT TABLE 15.2 HERE 
7.2  A simulation exercise with noisier value signals 
In this section, we test the conjecture about the magnitude of winner’s curse effect.  First, 
we generate a more volatile series of the secondary market price.  Then we carry out again 
the structural econometric procedures of section 6 to obtain the model’s parameters, but 
using this new price series for the estimation of the distribution of signals in stage 1 instead 
of the original one.   
To generate this new series of the secondary market price, we model the observed 
secondary market price with an AR (1) process -conditional on the CETES maturity- plus  
                                                 
38  The IEP index for CETES corresponds to the mean market interest rate at 12:15, determined through a 
survey to 12 participating institutions (Current sources for the CETES’ IEP are Banamex, Bank of America, 
Banorte, BBV, Bital, Chase Manhattan, Citibank, ING, Invex, JP Morgan, Santander Mexicano and Serfin).  
The three highest and three lowest reported rates are eliminated, so the CETES average rate is constructed 
from the remaining six reports. The index is constructed for CETES with 28, 91, 182, and 364 days maturity 
since June of 1996. 
39 However, the IEP indexes have a drawback:  they are perception indexes, not executable indexes.  This 
means that there is no intention to buy or sell securities at the quoted rates.  This may be a disadvantage for 
this exercise’s purpose, even though Enlaces Prebon explains that for these perception quotes are better than 
buy and sell quotes, because the latter tend to be biased by the traders’ market positions at the time of survey.   34
i.i.d. shocks.  This model yields a variance of shocks equal to 2.55 and an autoregressive 
parameter ρ=0.091.  Next, we use the AR (1) approximation method proposed by Tauchen 
(1986) to simulate 180 new data of the secondary market price, assuming that the new 
series will have the variance observed between June 1995 and March 1997, which is the 
period analyzed by Laviada et al (1997).  According to the data reported in table 15.1, in 
that period the variance of the daily funding rate (their secondary market price variable) 
equals 3.49.  Therefore, this variance is 55 percent higher than the one that characterizes the 
price series in our data set.  But this can still be regarded as a conservative simulation. 
The parameters estimated with the simulated price data are shown in Table 16.  We can 
observe a higher estimated value of the parameter γ.  This result can be interpreted as 
consistent with a setting in which the bidders face less informative signals.  In effect, as the 
value of γ increases 
γ V  becomes smaller (recall that 0<V<1) and the distribution of signals, 
[ ]
γ θ l l l Z V S sv z v s F − − = exp 1 ) ; , | ( 2 , |  collapses.  Also, as the value of gamma increases we 
would expect that the uniform price auction produces higher revenues, as a conclusive 
effect of the winner’s curse.  This is precisely what we find: the new total hypothetical 
revenue obtained from the uniform auction now is 81,506.33 billions of pesos.  This figure 
not only is 2.1 percent higher than the revenue observed from the discriminatory auctions, 
but also exceeds by 0.7 percent the revenue obtained in section 6. 
INSERT TABLE 16 HERE 
8.  Conclusions 
The share auction framework that supports the structural estimation method of FPV seems 
to provide an adequate characterization of Mexico’s CETES auctions during the analysis 
period, despite their institutional complexities.  The reason is that the buy option allocations 
have been a small proportion of the total amount issued by the Mexican Treasury through 
the primary auctions.  In this sense, the asymmetry that market makers’ buy option may be 
inducing in the primary auction behavior did not reflect as substantial changes in the 
estimated parameters.  With more detailed information regarding the auction and buy 
option results it would be desirable to solve for the complete set of equilibrium responses of 
the sales mechanism model.  But in Mexico, as in many countries, such additional detail is   35
not public data.  With the appropriate data, we think it would also be desirable to analyze a 
framework with asymmetric bidders, most likely by  using numerical solution methods.
40  
This would probably mimic better some of the characteristics of the data per bidder and bid 
reported in section 4. 
Although the obtained coefficients are significant and have a plausible size, the estimated 
value of the securities does not seem to be too sensitive to changes in the auction 
characteristics.  Moreover, the sign of some of the coefficients are not very intuitive and 
differ across the analyzed samples.  While some small sample bias may explain these 
findings, a selection criteria that permits choosing the exogenous variables that can best 
describe the auction heterogeneity may be needed.  The latter would contribute to raise the 
power of the estimation procedure and extend its applicability to other securities for which 
there is less data available than for the zero coupon bonds, particularly regarding the 
secondary market prices. 
Our results indicate that the uniform price auction produces higher revenue than the 
discriminatory price auction in the analyzed period, given the estimated parameters.  In the 
study of CETES auctions this is not a new result.  Previous estimations with reduced form 
equations have produced in the same conclusion.  However, we do find evidence that 
suggests that market volatility has diminished across the analyzed episodes, suggesting that 
the winner’s curse may have been alleviated.  As a result, the revenue difference between 
auction formats is lower in this study than in Umlauf’s or Laviada´s.  However, we find 
something new: we detect that the revenue difference between the two auction formats 
varies across CETES with different maturity.  The discriminatory format produces higher 
revenue than the uniform format in the 28 days securities auctions, while the uniform 
format produces higher revenue than the discriminatory format in the 91, 182, and 364 days 
securities auctions.  This positive relation between the gains of the uniform format and the 
securities’ maturity coincides with the Mexican Treasury practice of selling securities with 
maturity longer than one year through the uniform auction format. 
                                                 
40  See Armantier and Sabih (2003) or Hortacsu (2002) for  recent contributions in this area.   36
8.  Appendix 
 
INSERT TABLES A.1 AND A.2 
9.  Bibliography 
1.  Armantier, O. and E. Sabih (2003), “Estimation and Comparison of Treasury Auction 
Formats when Bidders are Asymmetric,” mimeograph, State University of New York at 
Stony Brook and GREMAQ, Université de Toulouse, May 2003. 
2.  Bartolini, Leonardo and Carlo Cottarelli (1994), “Treasury Bill Auctions: Issues and 
Uses,” IMF Working Paper 94/135. 
3.  Breedon, F. and J. Ganley (1996), “Bidding and Information:  Evidence from Gilt-
Edged Auctions,”  Bank of England, Working Paper Series No. 42, January 1996. 
4.  Février, P., Préget, R., and M. Visser (2002), “Econometrics of Share Auctions,”  
CREST Working Paper n° 2002-09, in revision for Econometrica. 
5.  Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1992), Game Theory, second printing, The MIT Press. 
6.  Gordy, M. B. (1996), “Hedging Winner’s Curse with Multiple Bids:  Evidence from the 
Portuguese Treasury Bill Auction,”  Bank of Portugal, Research And Statistics 
Department WP 21-96, Dec. 1996. 
7.  Green, W. H. (1993), Econometric Analysis, first edition, Macmillan Publishing 
Company. 
8.  Hamilton, J. D. (1994), Time Series Analysis, first edition, Princeton University Press. 
9.  Hausman, J. A. and W. K. Newey (1995), “Nonparametric Estimation of Exact 
Consumers Surplus and Deadweight Loss,”  Econometrica, Vol. 63, Issue 6, Nov. 1995, 
1445-1476.   37
10. Hortacsu, A. (2002), “Mechanism Choice and Strategic Bidding in Divisible Good 
Auctions:  An Empirical Analysis of the Turkish Treasury Auction Market,” mimeo., 
University of Chicago. 
11. Hortacsu, A. (2002a), “Bidding Behavior in Divisible Good Auctions: Theory and 
Evidence from the Turkish Treasury Auction Market,” mimeo., University of Chicago. 
12. Joint Report on the Government Securities Market, Department of the Treasury, 
Securities and Exchange Commission, and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, United States of America, January 1992. 
13. Laviada, B. and F. Laviada (1997), Análisis del Mecanismo de Subastas de Valores 
Gubernamentales en México, Tesis de Licenciatura en Economia, Universidad 
Iberoamericana. 
14. Mazón, C. and S. Núñez (1999), “On the optimality of treasury bond auctions: the 
Spanish case,”  Bank of Spain, Research Document No. 9905. 
15. Newey, W. K. and D. L. McFadden (1994), “Large sample estimation and hypothesis 
testing,”  in R. F. Engle and D. L. McFadden, eds., Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 4, 
2113-2245. 
16. Pagan, A. and A. Ullah (1999), Nonparametric Econometrics, first edition, Cambridge 
University Press. 
17. Pakes, A. (1991), “Dynamic Structural Models: Problems and Prospects. Mixed 
Continuous Discrete Controls and Market Interactions,” Cowles Foundation Discussion 
Papers 984, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. 
18. Pakes, A. (2003), “Common Sense and Simplicity in Empirical Industrial 
Organization,” mimeo., Harvard University. 
19. Scalia, A. (1998), “Bidder Profitability under Uniform Price Auctions and Systematic 
Reopenings,”  Journal of Fixed Income, 47-61.   38
20. Tauchen, G. (1986), “Finite State Markov Chain Approximations” Economic Letters, 
20, 17-181. 
21. Umlauf, S. R. (1993), “An empirical study of the Mexican Treasury bill auction,”  
Journal of Financial Economics, 33, 313-340. 
22. Uniform Price Auctions:  Evaluation of the Treasury Experience,  Department of the 
Treasury,  U.S. Treasury,  October 1995. 
23. Uniform Price Auctions:  Update of the Treasury Experience,  Department of the 
Treasury,  U.S. Treasury,  October 1998. 
24. Wilson, R. (1979), “Auctions of Shares,”  The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 
93, Issue 4, Nov. 1979, 675-689. 
   39
Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1.  CETES 
(balance outstanding) 
Year CETES
   Change %  Dollar Change%  % of All Government Securities
1 
 Pesos  Dollars     Pesos  Dollars 
1997  137,812,544  17,081,165        0.51  0.51 
1998 127,600,335  12,893,742  -7.41  -24.51  0.36  0.36 
1999 129,044,534  13,585,637  1.13  5.37  0.24  0.24 
2000 175,068,861  18,217,742  35.67  34.10  0.24  0.24 
2001 196,673,885  21,448,703  12.34  17.74  0.26  0.26 
2002 197,438,671  18,913,018  0.39  -11.82  0.23  0.23 
Source:  Banco de México 
 
Table 2.  Government Securities; Balance Outstanding 1997-2002 
 









1997 Pesos  137,812,544  81,768,269  36,678,360 N/E 15,950,568  272,209,741 
   Dollars  17,081,165 10,134,761  4,546,096  N/E  1,976,992  33,739,014 
1998 Pesos  127,600,335  151,835,597  62,833,444 N/E 10,970,484  353,239,859 
   Dollars  12,893,742 15,342,663  6,349,185  N/E  1108543.98 35,694,134 
1999 Pesos  129,044,534 337,270,992  80,008,050  N/E  564  546,324,140 
   Dollars  13,585,637 35,507,442  8,423,141  N/E  59.3771714 57,516,280 
2000 Pesos  175,068,861 420,255,890  86,644,593  34,870,116  0  716,839,460 
   Dollars  18,217,742 43,732,012  9,016,274  3,628,600  0  74,594,628 
2001 Pesos  196,673,885  348,988,019 94,846,730 122,329,819  0  762,838,454 
   Dollars  21,448,703 38,059,656 10,343,719 13,340,948  0  83,193,026 
2002 Pesos  197,438,671  343,345,208 99,767,654 235,088,796  0  875,640,329 
   Dollars  18,913,018 32,889,677  9,556,930  22,519,594  0  83,879,219 
Source:  Banco de México 
  (1) Does not include Bonos de Regulación Monetaria, Bonos IPAB and Federal Government Bonds in foreign currency. 
  Thousand pesos and  thousand dollars. 
 
Table 3.  Overall information about the CETES auctions 
(January 2001-April 2002) 
Number of Auctions  180 
   28 days CETES  65   (36.11%) 
   91 days CETES  65   (36.11%) 
  182 days CETES  33   (18.33%) 
  364 days CETES  17     (9.45%) 
Number of bidders  3,581    
Number of bids  13,393 
  Allocated totally or partially  4,506   (33.64%) 
  Not allocated  8,887   (66.36%) 
Total amount issued by the Treasury
1  879,249,141 
  Competitive bids in the primary auction  823,388,150   (93.65%) 
  Non competitive bids in the buy option for market makers    55,860,991     (6.35%) 
(1) Thousands of pesos   40
Table 4.  Summary statistics per CETES auction 
(January 2001-April 2002) 












2 Maturity  of 
the security 
Cover 
Mean  19.46 73.92  4,538,043.48  96.84 10.30  109.18  3.24 
Standard Deviation  6.13 19.59  674,815.08  3.14  3.48 94.22  0.90 
Max  91  145  5,200,000  100 18.38 364  7.31 
Min  12  35 3,300,000  84.81  5.26 27  1.68 
Obs  180 180  180  180 180 180  180 












2 Maturity  of 
the security 
Cover 
Mean  18.90 72.12  4,500,000.00  99.30  9.13  28.00  3.02 
Standard Deviation  2.70  16.54  0.00  0.25 3.07 0.28  0.81 
Max  27.00 107.00  4,500,000.00  100.00 16.61  29.00 5.66 
Min  15.00 42.00  4,500,000.00  98.74  5.65  27.00  1.70 
Obs  65 65  65  65 65 65  65 












2 Maturity  of 
the security 
Cover 
Mean  19.63 78.71  5,200,000.00  97.62  9.74  91.00  3.60 
Standard Deviation  3.41  18.68  0.00  0.78 2.93 0.28  0.87 
Max  29.00 128.00  5,200,000.00  100.00 17.01  92.00 6.37 
Min  13.00 35.00  5,200,000.00  95.80  5.92  90.00  2.32 
Obs  65 65  65  65 65 65  65 












2 Maturity  of 
the security 
Cover 
Mean  18.61 68.86  3,300,000.00  94.91 10.59  178.96  3.38 
Standard Deviation  3.11  20.39  0.00  1.41 2.75 5.83  1.17 
Max  25.00 112.00  3,300,000.00  97.51  16.53 182.00  7.31 
Min  13.00 40.00  3,300,000.00  92.11  6.49 168.00  1.78 
Obs  33 33  33  33 33 33  33 












2 Maturity  of 
the security 
Cover 
Mean  19.00 78.00  4,646,153.85  89.16 11.20  348.77  3.02 
Standard Deviation  3.34 27.70  161,324.64  2.12  2.18 14.52  0.97 
Max  25.00 145.00  5,000,000.00  92.23  15.36 364.00  4.45 
Min  14.00 43.00  4,500,000.00  85.61  8.34 335.00  1.68 
Obs  17 17  17  17 17 17  17 
(1)  Thousands of pesos 
(2)  Weighted allocation rate of the primary auction. 
 
Table 5.  Summary Statistics per bidder or per bid in the CETES auctions 





Maximum Minimum Observations 
Number of bids per bidder  3.85 0.75 7.69  0.64  3,581 
Demanded quantity per bidder
1  770,628.39 215,108.12  1,461,470.59  205,625.27  3,581 
Demanded quantity per bid
1  204,299.71 61,087.98 418,285.71  116,342.35  13,393 
Allocated bids per winning bidder  2.04 0.82 4.09  0.12  4,506 
Allocated quantity per winning bidder
1  576,621.62 531,294.24  2,600,000.00  183,333.33  4,506 
Allocated quantity per winning bid
1  432,918.42 571,619.13  2,600,000.00  64,705.88  4,506 
Price bid  96.68 3.19 99.57  84.55  13,393 
Highest price bid – lowest price bid  0.38 0.42 2.58  0.04  13,393 
(1)  Thousands of pesos 
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Table 6.  Summary Statistics per CETES buy option 
(January 2001-April 2002) 






















Amount / Amount 
Issued at the 
Primary Auction 
(%) 
Mean  900,000,000.00 471,186,288.14 342,237,135.59  52.35  4,500,000,000.00  10.47 
Median  900,000,000.00 200,000,000.00 200,000,000.00  22.22  4,500,000,000.00  4.44 
Mode  900,000,000.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  4,500,000,000.00 0.00 
Standard Deviation  0.00 614,042,270.30  365,826,041.46  68.23  0.00  13.65 
Maximum  900,000,000.00 2,050,000,000.00 900,000,000.00  227.78  4,500,000,000.00  45.56 
Minimum  900,000,000.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  4,500,000,000.00 0.00 






















Amount / Amount 
Issued at the 
Primary Auction 
(%) 
Mean  1,040,000,000.00 504,718,305.08  399,983,050.85  48.53  5,196,610,169.49  9.72 
Median  1,040,000,000.00 100,000,000.00  100,000,000.00  9.62  5,200,000,000.00  1.92 
Mode  1,040,000,000.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  5,200,000,000.00  0.00 
Standard Deviation  0.00 666,345,528.35  457,764,262.91  64.07  26,037,782.20  12.82 
Maximum  1,040,000,000.00 2,580,000,000.00 1,040,000,000.00 248.08  5,200,000,000.00  49.62 
Minimum  1,040,000,000.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  5,000,000,000.00  0.00 






















Amount / Amount 
Issued at the 
Primary Auction 
(%) 
Mean  660,000,000.00 241,333,333.33 222,666,666.67  36.57  3,300,000,000.00  7.31 
Median  660,000,000.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  3,300,000,000.00 0.00 
Mode  660,000,000.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  3,300,000,000.00 0.00 
Standard Deviation  0.00 323,107,042.51  287,113,258.12  48.96  0.00  9.79 
Maximum  660,000,000.00 960,000,000.00 660,000,000.00  145.45  3,300,000,000.00  29.09 
Minimum  660,000,000.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  3,300,000,000.00 0.00 






















Amount / Amount 
Issued at the 
Primary Auction 
(%) 
Mean  927,142,857.14 402,857,142.86 385,000,000.00  42.71%  4,635,714,285.71  8.54% 
Median  920,000,000.00 0.00  0.00  0.00%  4,600,000,000.00  0.00% 
Mode  920,000,000.00 0.00  0.00  0.00%  4,600,000,000.00  0.00% 
Standard Deviation  31,968,390.98  492,691,642.86  468,233,176.62 52.20% 159,841,954.91  10.44% 
Maximum  1,000,000,000.00 1,100,000,000.00 1,000,000,000.00 122.22%  5,000,000,000.00  24.44% 
Minimum  900,000,000.00 0.00  0.00  0.00%  4,500,000,000.00  0.00% 
(1)  Pesos. 
Table 7.  Frequency distribution of the CETES buy option 
(January 2001-April 2002) 
Maturity  28 days CETES  91 days CETES  182 days CETES  364 days CETES 
Event  Obs % Obs % Obs % Obs % 
Market makers Aggregated 

















Market makers Aggregated 

















Market makers Aggregated 
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Table 8.  Overall information about the CETES auctions of sample II 
Number of auctions  71 
   28 days CETES   21   (29.58%) 
   91 days CETES   25   (35.21%) 
   182 days CETES   17   (23.94%) 
   364 days CETES    8   (11.27%) 
Number of bidders  1,343 
Number of bids  5,018 
  Allocated totally or partially  1,829   (36.45%) 
  Not allocated  3,189   (63.55%) 
Total amount issued by the Treasuryl
1  323,788,150 
  Competitive bids in the primary auction  323,788,150   (100%) 
  Non competitive bids in the buy option for market makers  0 
(1) Thousands of  pesos. 
 
Table 9.  Summary Statistics per CETES auction of Sample II 




















Mean  18.92 70.68  4,467,605.63  96.26  10.49  121.92  3.08 
Standard Deviation  3.24 20.06  724,228.58  3.56  3.16 97.61  1.05 
Max  29.00 128.00  5,200,000.00  100.00  17.01 364.00  7.31 
Min  13.00 35.00  3,300,000.00  85.61  6.15  28.00  1.70 
Obs  71 71  71 71  71 71  71 
(1)  Thousands of pesos 
(2)  Weighted allocation rate of the primary auction. 
 





Maximum Minimum  Observations
Number of bids per bidder  3.70 0.65  5.19 2.47  1,343 
Demanded quantity per bidder
1  722,790.41 225,440.52 1,457,385.29  372,155.79  1,343 
Demanded quantity per bid
1  197,314.89 62,019.37  418,285.71  116,342.35 5,018 
Allocated bids per winning bidder  2.12 0.82  3.71 0.31  1,829 
Allocated quantity per winning bidder
1  693,967.89 671,205.67 2,600,000.00  183,333.33  1,829 
Allocated quantity per winning bid
1  530,135.86 725,451.89 2,600,000.00  73,333.33  1,829 
Price bid  96.12 3.57  99.52  85.36  5,018 
Highest price bid – lowest price bid  0.41 0.42  2.58 0.05  5,018 
(1)  Thousands of pesos. 
 
Table 11.  Second step estimate of θ  in sample I 
Estimate of alpha:   Standard  Error 
Constant -15.27710  0.97630 
Secondary market price  148.42810  0.92758 
Nominal yield  -12.55930  0.11267 
Maturity
1 -4.74920  0.43610 
Estimate of beta:    
Constant -29.80050  0.63808 
Secondary market price  151.14290  0.60659 
Nominal yield  12.93690  0.07355 
Maturity
1 0.38890  0.28267 
Gamma  118.73350 0.66655 
(1)  Divided by 364.   43
 
Table 12.  Second step estimate of θ  in sample II 
Estimate of alpha:   Standard  Error 
Constant 7.15020  2.88818 
Secondary market price  105.41850  2.71999 
Nominal yield  -150.45390  0.34874 
Maturity
1 -3.57240  1.36952 
Estimate of beta:      
Constant 493.54630  0.31200 
Secondary market price  -7.68270  0.29487 
Nominal yield  24.94770  0.03710 
Maturity
1 5.82230  0.14142 
Gamma  287.84650 1.58210 
(1)  Divided by 364 
 
Table 13. Mean of difference in revenue –Discriminatory minus estimated uniform 
      Confidence interval (95%) 
  Mean  Mean bootstrap  Lower bound  Upper bound 
Sample I  -6.3968 -7.4383 -8.4476  -4.5051 
Sample II  -9.0138 -9.6176 -12.5375  -5.2512 
In millions of pesos 
 
Table 14.  αl, βl, conditional mean, variance and variation coefficient of V
γ1 








Sample I  125.68  117.97 1.0653 0.0090  0.0891 
Sample II  91.65  490.72 0.1868 0.0004  0.1071 
Février,Préget, and Visser (2002)  3045.04  848.72 3.5878 0.0042  0.0181 
(1)  Evaluated at the characteristics’ sample mean. 
 
Table 15.1  Auction Revenue and Market Volatility Comparison with Previous 
Reduced Form Estimations for 28 days CETES 
Analysis Date 





(millions of pesos) 
Hypothetical 
Revenue of Uniform 
Auctions 








Aug 1986- May1991 
(Umlauf, 1993)  2.44pb 73.742 73.742  0.000%  0.160 
Jun 1995- Mar 1997 
(Laviada et al, 1997)  18.96pb 8,557.539  8,557.706  0.002%  3.498 
Jan 2001-Apr 2002 
(present)  -- 29,657,590.272  29,398,572.997  -0.873%  0.096 
 





(millions of pesos) 
Hypothetical 
Revenue of Uniform 
Auctions 







28 days  7,572.253 7,518.962  -0.70%  0.052 
91 days  8,564.527 8,690.297  1.47%  0.064 
182 days  5,321.119 5,511.703  3.58%  0.067 
364 days  7,141.314 7,807.403  9.33%  0.046 
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Table 16  Second step estimate of θ  using a simulated secondary market price series 
distributed with mean 3.70 and variance 3.49 
Estimate of alpha:   Standard  Error 
Constant 327.1935  0.00000015 
Secondary market price  162.8496  0.00001419 
Nominal yield  20.2399  0.00000151 
Maturity
1 447.9777  0.00000002 
Estimate of beta:    
Constant 5.4844  0.00003000 
Secondary market price  34.3807  0.00290531 
Nominal yield  82.8601  0.00030871 
Maturity
1 2031.6185  0.00000309 
Gamma  745.6563 14.10575237 
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Figure 1.  Bootstrap density function of the difference in revenue between the 
discriminatory and the uniform auction formats for Sample 1 (millions of pesos) 
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Figure 1.  Bootstrap density function of the difference in revenue between the 
discriminatory and the uniform auction formats for Sample II (millions of pesos) 
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Figure 3.  Revenue difference between the (observed) discriminatory auction and the 
(hypothetical) uniform auction in Sample  I 
a.  28 days CETES 
(percentages) 
 
b.  91 days CETES 
(percentages) 
 
c.  182 days CETES 
(percentages) 
 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.  Revenue difference between the (observed) discriminatory auction and the 
(hypothetical) uniform auction in Sample  II 
a.  28 days CETES 
(percentages) 
 
b.  91 days CETES 
( percentages) 
 
c.  182 days CETES 
( percentages) 
 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.1.  CETES’ Sales Mechanisms (1978-2002) 
Date Mechanism 
1978-1982  Tap with a fixed rate 
1982-1985 Discriminatory  auction with fixed offered amount 
-  Limit to the maximum bid per bidder is 40 percent of the amount issued 
1985-July 1986  Tap with a fixed rate 
July 1986-July 1990  Discriminatory auction with variable offered amount. 
-  Brokerage houses cannot bid for debt of more than a hundred times their capital 
basis. 
-  In July 1989 the limit to the maximum bid per bidder is raised to 60 percent of 
the amount issued. 
July 1989-January 1993  Uniform auction with variable offered amount 
January 1993-April 1994  Discriminatory auction with variable offered amount (allocations to non 
competitive bids in the primary auction are reduced). 
April 1994-November 1995  Uniform auction with variable offered amount 
November 1995-April 2002  Discriminatory auction with variable offered amount (allocations to non 
competitive bids in the primary auction are reduced). 
-  No institution can bid for debt of more than a hundred times their capital basis. 
-  Banks were the only institutions allowed to submit bids in account for others until 
2000. 
-  Since January 2000 the Treasury may increase the supply of 182 and 364 days 
CETES. 
-  “Market makers” mechanism is introduced in October 2000. 
Source:  Banco de México’s Yearly Report (several numbers) and regulatory dispositions for financial intermediaries. 
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Table A.2.  Key Modifications to the Treasury Securities Market Maker Mechanism 




-  Those financial institutions willing to become market makers should present a petition within the first 10 market days of 
the semester before the one they want to start to operate. 
-  The evaluation of the market making activity index will take place every 6 months.  The accumulated activity index 
during the previous 6 months will be used to determine which financial intermediaries may operate as market makers 
during the next six months. 
-  The maximum spread between bid and ask price quotes in the secondary market is set at 200 basis points. 
-  The weights of the market making activity index are set as:   0.15 for primary market operations, 0.25 for operations in 
the secondary market with clients, 0.40 for operations in the secondary market among financial intermediaries carried out 
through trading houses, and 0.20 for operations in the secondary market among financial intermediaries carried out through 
other means. 
-  The maximum amount of government securities that market makers as a group can get at the weighted allocation rate is 
set at 20 percent of the amount issued at the primary auction. 
-  The maximum amount of government securities that each market maker can bid for at the weighted allocation rate is set 
at 20 percent of the amount issued at the primary auction.  If market makers’ aggregate demand does not exceed supply, 
each market maker gets her bid.  If market makers’ aggregate demand exceeds supply, bids are served up to the minimum 
amount between the quantity bid and the supply divided among the number of bidders.  The rest is distributed 
proportionally according to the each market maker’s original quantity bid until supply is exhausted. 
January 
2001 
-  The maximum amount of government securities that each market maker can get at the weighted allocation rate is set at 
the minimum between 20 percent of the amount issued at the primary auction and the amount allocated to her at the 
primary auction.  If market makers’ aggregate demand does not exceed supply, each market maker gets her bid.  If market 
makers’ aggregate demand exceeds supply, bids are served proportionally according to each market maker’s original 
quantity bid and the percentage allocated to her at the primary auction. 
May  2001  The weights of the market making activity index are set as:   0.20 for primary market operations, 0.30 for operations in the 
secondary market with clients, 0.30 for operations in the secondary market among financial intermediaries carried out 
through trading houses, and 0.20 for operations in the secondary market among financial intermediaries carried out through 
other means. 
-  The maximum amount of government securities that each market maker can get at the weighted allocation rate is set at 
the minimum between 20 percent of the amount issued at the primary auction and the amount of computable bids that she 
presened at the primary auction.  A bid is “computable” if its rate bid is less than or equal to the product of 1.002 times the 
highest rate that receives an allocation at the primary auction. 
November 
2001 
-  Those financial institutions willing to become market makers should present a petition within the first 10 market days of 
February, May, August, and November. 
-  The evaluation of the market making activity index will take place every month.  The activity index will include 
information of operations carried out by the institutions and ordered in measuring periods that correspond to the last 6 
months. 
-  The maximum spread between bid and ask price quotes in the secondary market is set at 125 basis points. 
-  The maximum amount of government securities that each market maker can get at the weighted allocation rate is set at 
the minimum between 20 percent of the amount issued at the primary auction and the amount of computable bids that she 
presened at the primary auction.  A bid is “computable” if its rate bid is less than or equal to the product of: 
a)  1.0035 times the highest rate that receives an allocation at the primary auction, if the market maker’s 
activity index is the highest one; 
b)  1.003 times the highest rate that receives an allocation at the primary auction, if the market maker’s 
activity index is the second highest one; 
c)  1.0025 times the highest rate that receives an allocation at the primary auction, if the market maker’s 
activity index is the third highest one; 
d)  1.002 times the highest rate that receives an allocation at the primary auction, for the other market 
makers. 
Source:  Banco de Mexico’s regulatory dispositions for banks and brokerage houses.  